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IMPORTED INEQUALITY?  IMMIGRATION AND  
INCOME INEQUALITY IN THE AMERICAN STATES 
 
Abstract 
 In this paper we use data from the American states from 1996 to 2008 to explore the effects of 
immigration on income inequality. Empirical evidence from both static and dynamic models shows that the 
foreign-born population has a strong positive effect on state-level income inequality, even when we 
control for a range of federal and state political and economic contextual variables. We also find that the 
positive relationship between immigration and state income inequality is driven primarily by low-skill 
immigrants (rather than high-skill immigrants), and we provide some evidence that high-skill immigrants 
lower income inequality for some segments of the income distribution. We conclude that immigration—
particularly low-skilled immigration—has an important effect on income inequality in the American states.  
 
 
 
 
 The past three decades have seen a substantial rise in income inequality in the United States. Since the 
1970s, the income gap between the rich and the poor has escalated rapidly and exceeded that of most 
other industrial democracies (Bartels, 2008; Jacobs, 2005; Nathan. Kelly, 2009). The ever-growing income 
disparities in the United States have profound political consequences. Arguably, it leads to party 
polarization at the national and subnational levels (Garand, 2010; McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal, 2006),  
challenges the fundamental democratic principles of equal citizenship and government responsiveness to 
the majority (Bartels, 2009), and depresses political participation (Jacobs, 2005; Solt, 2008).  
 In the American context, political scientists have renewed their interests in using the political economy 
framework to study how two major forces—markets and politics—shape income inequality in the 
American democracy (Soss and Jacobs, 2010). On one hand, political economists who emphasize the role 
of market forces attribute increased income inequality primarily to changes in labor market institutions 
(Levy and Temin, 2007), the economic impact of trade-liberalization (Richardson, 1995), immigration 
(Borjas 1994), and the mismatch between education and the technological needs of the American 
economy (Goldin and Katz, 2008). On the other hand, scholars who underscore the institutional 
determinants of income inequality focus on the ideology of political incumbents (Bartels, 2008; McCarty et 
al., 2006), various neoliberal policies such as tax reforms, minimum wage and welfare policies (Bartels, 
2008; Hero and Preuhs, 2007), the unequal political representation of the high- and low-income groups 
(Hacker and Pierson, 2010), and the decline of the American civic society (Putnam, 2000; Skocpol, 2003).   
 Among those political and economic determinants of inequality, immigration has been one of the 
most controversial. Based on analyses of individual-level wage data, economists suggest that immigration 
has a positive effect on wage inequality in popular immigrant-receiving countries such as the United States 
(Borjas 1994; 2000; Hatton and Williamson 1998; Williamson 1997), while others argue that immigrants 
have little effect on domestic labor market outcomes such as wages, unemployment rates, and wage 
inequality (Altonji and Card, 1991; Card, 1990, 2007, 2009). Political scientists have recently studied the 
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political determinants of income inequality and found that political partisan control and ideological 
orientation of governments play an important role in influencing inequality. 
 In this paper, we explore systematically the effects of immigration on income inequality in the 
American states, all-the-while accounting for the effects of the economic and political factors that help to 
shape levels of income inequality. We maintain that much of what we already know about immigration 
and income inequality is limited by the predominant focus on individual-level wage and labor market 
outcomes, but even these individual-level studies have generated mixed findings. To date relatively little is 
known about the linkage between these two concepts at the aggregate level. Moreover, the expanding 
American politics literature on income inequality is typically based on national-level data. Studies at the 
state-level have documented the importance of state political context in shaping inequality, but these 
studies have typically failed to take into account the effects of immigration.  
 To fill in this gap we consider how immigration and state political environment has combined to 
influence variation in income inequality across the 50 American states over time.  We test hypotheses 
about immigration and income inequality using both static and dynamic modeling based on pooled cross-
sectional time-series data for 50 American states from 1996 to 2008. Our project makes three 
contributions to understanding the political economy of income inequality in American states. First, our 
research is one of the first attempts to study the relationship between immigration and income inequality 
at the state level over an extensive time frame. We focus our attention on the effects of the general 
foreign-born population, but we also consider the effects of three specific immigrant groups—i.e., newly 
admitted legal permanent residents, low-skill immigrants, and high-skill immigrants—on income 
inequality.  We find that the foreign-born population and, particularly, low-skill immigrants have a strong 
positive effect on income inequality.  Second, we go beyond the static association between immigration 
and income inequality found in much of the scholarly literature by considering more complex dynamics. 
We find that both the foreign-born population and low-skill immigrants have positive long-term effects on 
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state-level income inequality. Third, both the foreign-born population and low-skill immigrants also have a 
positive effect on the relative income ratios between high- and lower- to middle-income groups (i.e., 
90/10, 90/20, 90/30, 90/40, and 90/50 income ratios), while high-skill immigrants attenuate the relative 
income ratios for groups in some parts of the income distribution. These findings verify our argument that 
immigrants in the U.S. are bifurcated in their skills, which contributes to the rising income inequality.     
 Finally, by focusing on state-level income inequality, we find that the dynamics of income inequality at 
the subnational level differ from those observed at the national level. Kelly and Enns (2010) find that 
income inequality at the national level is self-reinforcing through the ways in which the poor and the rich 
respond to changes in inequality. On the other hand, our findings suggest that (1) state-level income 
inequality is self-correcting, which verifies Kelly and Witko’s (2012) argument that American state 
governments are more active in fighting income inequality, and (2) compared to the federal government 
state governments have more means to do so. When considered together, these findings suggest the 
critical role that states have in shaping income inequality in the American democracy.  
IMMIGRATION, LABOR MARKETS, POLICIES, AND INCOME INEQUALITY 
 The U.S. has been thought of for some time as a country of immigrants, and contemporary experience 
reinforces that perception. At its peak time during the 1910s, the U.S. maintained a foreign-born 
population of almost 15%. After declining to a low of 4.7% in the early 1970s, the foreign-born population 
increased to approximately 13% of the total U.S. population in 2010, and in the past decade the U.S. has 
admitted about 1.3 million new arrivals every year (Camarota, 2012). What makes today’s immigration 
issue dramatically different from a century ago is the demographic composition of the immigrant 
population. During the immigration wave between 1880 and 1921, immigrants from southern and Eastern 
Europe resembled the American population prevailing at the time. Yet in recent years the demographic 
and country-of-original makeup of the American immigration population has changed.  As of 2010 about 
53% of immigrants are from Mexico, Central America, the Caribbean, or South America (Camarota, 2012); 
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further, about 59% of the illegal immigrant population in the United States in 2011 is from Mexico, with 
another 14% from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras (Hoefer, Rytina, and Baker, 2011). Many 
immigrants come to the United States with relatively low education, weak English skills, lower 
socioeconomic background, and other attributes that put them at a competitive disadvantage in the labor 
market when compared to native-born Americans (Camarota, 2012; Card, 2009; Passel, 2005). For 
instance, according to U.S. Census Bureau data from 2009, 89% of native-born Americans have a high-
school degree or more, while only 68% of the foreign-born population has a high-school degree or more 
(Ryan and Siebens, 2012). Moreover, Reeves and Venator (2014) use 2011 CPS data to make the point that 
immigrants from Latin American countries are much more likely than immigrants from other regions of the 
world to have lower education levels; while 56% of first-generation immigrants from all countries have a 
high-school education or less, the same is true for 73% of first-generation immigrants from Latin American 
countries. Clearly, immigrants enter the American labor market with lower average education levels than 
the native-born population, and this is particularly true for the current configuration of the immigrant 
population that has a higher share of immigrants from Latin American countries.    
Historical evidence in comparative politics 
 Economists have studied the linkage between immigration and inequality for some time. They have 
observed the migration waves in the late 19th century and found that inequality increased in resource-rich 
and immigrant-receiving countries such as Argentina, Australia, Canada, and the United States. They 
speculate that as low-skill immigrants “flooded the receiving countries’ labor markets at the bottom of the 
skill ladder, they must have lowered unskilled wages relative to those of skilled artisans and educated 
white-collar workers and relative to land rents” (Williamson 1997: 125). This same pattern was found in 
immigrant-importing countries in the second half of the 20th century. Low-skill immigrants increased 
receiving countries’ low-skill labor supply and consequently increased inequality (Hatton and Williamson 
(1997). Alderson and Nielsen (2002) find that immigration has a moderately positive effect on income 
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inequality in the 16 OECD countries, while Moore and Pacey (2003) find that immigration leads to 
increases in inequality in Canadian metropolitan areas.   
Evidence from the United States 
 In the United States scholars have debated the effects of these immigrants on domestic labor market 
outcomes such as wages, unemployment, and inequality, yet no consensus has been reached in the 
scholarly literature thus far. In most cases scholars have used micro-level wage data to examine the effects 
of immigrants on labor market outcomes. They find that immigrants on average have lower levels of 
earnings than their native-born counterparts. By analyzing Census data over the years, Borjas (1994) finds 
that the skills of the immigrants entering the U.S. in the post-WWII period declined drastically, and as a 
result this new immigrant wave earned about 17% less when they first arrived in the U.S. than native-born 
Americans.  Immigrants also tended to concentrate in low-wage occupations such as construction, 
seasonal agricultural work, meatpacking, yard service, gardening, and household work (see also Hanson 
2004). Borjas has even made a rather bold prediction that it is unlikely that immigrants will catch up 
economically with their native-born counterparts during their working lives (Borjas 1994: 1713).  
 Furthermore, the presence of low-skill immigrants increases competition in the lower-wage labor 
market and alters the supply-demand dynamics of labor. As a result, the influx of low-skill immigrants 
could depress wages and reduce job opportunities for domestic workers in the low-wage labor market 
(Borjas 1994, 2004) . For instance, Borjas et al. (1997) estimate that less-skilled immigration accounted for 
approximately one-third of the decline in the relative wage of high school dropouts in the U.S. between 
1980 and 1988. Immigrant workers who came to the United States between 1980 and 2000 reduced the 
average annual salary of native-born Americans without a high school education by 7.4% (Borjas, 2004). 
Using data from the Current Population Survey (CPS) in the 1980s, Topel (2003) also finds that labor 
markets with the strongest immigrant presence experienced the steepest decline in the wages of native 
low-skill workers. 
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 Despite a large amount of empirical evidence supporting the adverse effects of immigration on labor 
market outcomes for native-born workers, scholars such as David Card argue otherwise. Based on 
empirical evidence from cross-city comparisons, Card argues in a series of papers that immigrants only 
have a very small effect (if any at all) on wages and unemployment rates for domestic low-skill workers. 
Card (1990) conducted a natural experiment based on the 1980 Mariel boatlift delivering 125,000 Cuban 
immigrants to Miami, Florida. By comparing the wages and unemployment rates in Miami and four other 
cities (i.e., Tampa, Atlanta, Houston and Los Angeles) before and after the boatlift, he claims that the 
Cuban immigrants had virtually no effect on wages and unemployment rates in Miami.  Instead, the Miami 
labor market quickly absorbed these Cuban immigrants without affecting native low-skill workers or even 
other immigrants who arrived to Miami earlier. Further, Card (1990) analyzes U.S. Census data and finds 
that immigration has no effect on the income growth of the lowest 10th percentile native-born workers in 
24 major cities in the United States. Hence he concludes that immigrants did not really depress the income 
of lower-skill workers. Card and his colleagues later expanded the study to 120 major cities, where they 
could only find modest competition between immigrants and less-skilled native-born workers—i.e., every 
1% increase in immigration only reduced wages for native low-skilled workers by about 1.2% (Altonji and 
Card 1991). Finally, in his most recent work on the subject, Card (2009) claims that immigration has no 
effect on wage inequality among native-born workers. However, because immigrants themselves are 
clustered at the high and low ends of the education distribution, they do have a more visible positive effect 
on wage inequality among all workers. 
Additional immigration-based sources of income inequality 
 Previous research by economists has focused primarily on immigrants’ effect on labor market 
outcomes such as wages and job opportunities, and their studies have primarily focused on individuals and 
the aggregate city level. Even though they do not agree on whether or not immigrants negatively affect 
domestic workers’ economic situations, what they do agree on are that (1) the immigrant population is 
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bifurcated in terms of labor-market skills, language abilities, education, and income levels, and (2) this 
bifurcation could contribute to overall income inequality. Yet there is more to the immigration-inequality 
story. We argue that immigrants face additional constraints in terms of lawful employment practices and 
eligibility for government-funded welfare programs in the United States, and these constraints further 
depress the economic status of immigrants in comparison with native-born citizens and hence contribute 
to higher levels of income inequality.  
 To a large degree, immigrants—particularly illegal immigrants—face formidable barriers to legal 
employment in the labor market in comparison with their native-born counterparts. In the face of the 
current wave of immigration, many states have adopted strict regulations requiring employers to check 
the legal status of immigrants in the work force. For instance, Arizona, Mississippi, South Carolina, 
Alabama, Georgia and North Carolina have passed laws that require almost all of their businesses to use 
the E-verify program to check on employment eligibility for prospective employees, and since the passage 
of such laws many other states have followed suit. In states where employment eligibility is checked, 
undocumented immigrants face greater constraints on both their employability and, if employed, their 
wages, and this could directly result in diminished economic status for immigrants when compared to their 
native-born counterparts.  
 Second, for many Americans unearned income derived from public assistance and other benefits 
received from the federal and state governments is an important supplement for earned income. This 
income component is especially important for low-income workers because it provides them with a social 
safety net which could support them during difficult economic times. However, in 1996 the U.S. Congress 
passed the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act (PRWORA), which barred immigrants from 
all federal-funded welfare benefits in the first five years after their arrival. As a result, immigrants are 
ineligible to receive financial assistance such as Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) in the first 
5 years, although there were exceptions written into the law and states could use state funds to support 
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immigrant families. The fact that many immigrants are ineligible to receive federal welfare benefits means 
that they may not be as financially stable as similarly-situated native-born citizens, and this could result in 
lower post-redistribution income and, subsequently, higher levels of income inequality. 
 In this paper we try to put all the pieces together in order to tell a story on how immigration influences 
inequality. Most of the work examining the linkage between immigration and inequality has focused on 
individual- and city-level evidence. To fill in the vacuum created by the scarcity of research that has 
examined the aggregate level relationship between immigration and inequality, we explore how 
immigration influences income inequality in the American states. We use the American states as our unit 
of analysis because states vary considerably in their immigration-relevant policies and their socioeconomic 
and cultural contexts. As a result, each state creates a unique environment within in which immigrants 
work and live. We posit that for the post-1996 time period there is a positive relationship between 
immigrants and income inequality in the U.S. for the following reasons: (1) the immigrant population is 
highly bifurcated in its education, language abilities, job skills, and income; (2) there is a reasonable chance 
that immigrants have increased competition in the low-wage job market and thus have reduced wages for 
the low-income group in general; (3) low-skill immigrants—particularly illegal immigrants—face additional 
constraints than their native counterparts in seeking legal employment; and (4) immigrants are excluded 
from important components of the American social safety net in at least the first five years after they 
arrive in the United States.  
 We also explore the possibility that some immigrants may contribute more to higher income 
inequality than other immigrants. Specifically, we consider the effects of three specific immigrant groups: 
(1) newly admitted legal permanent residents, (2) low-skill immigrants, and (3) high-skill immigrants. First 
of all, new legal permanent residents are granted legal work permits and may have ready access to 
employment options; subsequently they are likely to face fewer impediments in the labor market than 
undocumented immigrants. Moreover, many legal permanent residents have lived in the U.S. for a 
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sufficiently long time and are hence eligible to receive welfare benefits and participate in other programs 
in the social safety net if needed. The end result is that new legal permanent residents may not contribute 
as much to higher income inequality as other types of foreign-born population. Secondly, since our 
argument about the immigration-inequality linkage centers around the bifurcated skill sets of low-skill and 
high-skill immigrants, we contend that these two immigrant groups influence levels of income inequality.  
DATA AND METHODS 
 We explore the effects of immigration on income inequality by using pooled cross-sectional time-
series (CSTS) data from the American states for the years 1996 to 2008. We connect state-level inequality 
in (post-transfer) disposable family income with four immigration measures: (1) the overall foreign-born 
population; (2) the inflow of newly admitted legal permanent residents; (3) low-skill immigrants; and (4) 
high-skill immigrants.  We also include in our model a set of political, economic, and demographic control 
variables that are suggested in previous scholarly research to influence income inequality.  
Dependent Variable  
 Income inequality. We use the Gini coefficients for state-level disposable family income inequality as 
the key measure of our dependent variable. Data on the measure come from Guetzkow, Western, and 
Rosenfeld (2007) for the 1996-2003 time period, as well as from our update of their data from 2004 to 
2008, generated by using the same procedures. This variable captures post-transfer income inequality, 
insofar as it is based on an income measure that includes earnings (such as wages and salary) and 
unearned income (such as government transfers and benefits). Since the economic and policy climate 
varies substantially across states (within which immigrants can be integrated into the state economy and 
the state safety-net system), it is appropriate to measure income inequality based on an income variable 
that includes a wide range of income sources, including both earned income such as wages and salaries 
and unearned income such as public assistance and benefits.  
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 Income ratios. As a check on the robustness of our results, we also include data on various income 
ratios to capture the inequality of incomes for the upper, middle, and lower classes. We focus our 
attention on standard ratios in the literature that capture the income ratios for upper (90th percentile), 
middle (50th percentile), and lower (10th percentile) groups, so we begin our robustness check by modeling 
the 90/50, 90/10, and 50/10 ratios. We also expand this analysis to include the use of income ratios for the 
90th percentile to the 20th, 30th and 40th percentiles; by doing so we capture income disparities for the 
upper class and various groups below the middle class.  
Immigration Independent Variables 
 Foreign-born population.  We use the percentage of foreign-born in the total population in each state 
as our general measure of immigration. This measure not only includes permanent resident immigrants 
and naturalized citizens, but also temporary legal foreign-born immigrants and undocumented 
immigrants.1 Data on the foreign-born population are collected from Current Population Surveys dating 
from 1996 to 2008.  Regrettably, data at the state level on foreign-born population prior to 1996 are 
available only during Census years, so we are unable to extend our yearly analysis to earlier years. We 
hypothesize that the coefficient for this variable will be positive, indicating that income inequality 
increases with higher levels of foreign-born population. 
 Newly admitted Legal Permanent Residents (LPRs).  We use the percentage of newly admitted LPRs in 
the total population in each state as a measure for the inflow of permanent residents. According to our 
theoretical arguments, we expect that newly admitted LPRs will have an effect on income inequality that is 
indistinguishable from the effect of the general foreign-born population.   
 Low-Skill and High-Skill Immigration.  Americans are divided in how they think about high- and low-skill 
immigrants, particularly in terms of their perceptions of the economic benefits and costs of these two 
                                                     
1 While the CPS does include illegal immigrants in its sample, it does so without including sufficient information to 
identify illegal immigrants explicitly. It is also the case that the undocumented immigration population is likely 
underrepresented in the CPS—a typical feature of similar national household surveys. 
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immigrant groups (Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2010; Malhotra, Margolit, and Mo, 2013). We further 
disaggregate states’ foreign-born population by skill levels to calibrate the size of the low-skill and high-skill 
immigration subpopulations. Education attainment is a partial--albeit useful—proxy for skill levels. Using 
the Census Bureau’s Current Population Surveys Annual Social Economic Supplements, we measure the 
low-skill immigration variable as the percentage of immigrants who do not have a high-school diploma, 
while we measure the high-skill immigration variable as the percentage of immigrants who have earned a 
college degree or above. By disaggregating the total foreign-born population by skill levels we are able to 
unpack how these two subpopulation groups are linked to income inequality.   
Political contextual independent variables 
 Since Bartels’ (2008) work exploring the effect of presidential partisanship on income inequality in the 
U.S., scholars have documented the negative effect of conservative power in the federal/state government 
on income inequality (Kelly and Witko 2012). This reflects arguments from the comparative political 
economy literature suggesting that organizational power of the poor and working classes—such as left-
wing parties and labor unions—is more likely to favor the interests of the working class, resulting in lower 
income inequality.  On the other hand, organizational power of the middle and upper classes (such as 
right-wing parties) is more likely to support the interests of their middle- and high-income constituents, 
resulting in higher income inequality (Tufte 1980; Bradley et al., 2005; Korpi and Palme 2003). Following 
this argument we include a full set of political variables as explanations for state-level income inequality.  
 State government liberalism.  We consider state government liberalism as a possible explanation for 
income inequality. We use the state government liberalism indicator created by Berry, Ringquist, Fording 
and Hanson (1998), which measures the ideological orientation of each state government. This variable is 
measured on a scale that ranges from 0 to 100, with 0 meaning extremely conservative public ideology 
and 100 meaning extremely liberal ideology. This measure accounts for “the most important complexities 
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of applying the idea of political power resources to the context of the American states” (Kelly and Witko, 
2012: 418). We hypothesize that state government liberalism has a negative effect on income inequality.  
 Union density.  Union density measures the percentage of nonagricultural wage and salary employees 
(including public-sector employees) who are union members.  Data on union density are compiled by 
Hirsch (2012) , who collects state-level union density from 1964 to 2012 using a combination of Bureau of 
Labor Statistics (BLS) and the Current Population Survey (CPS) data. This measure varies from a low of 2.3% 
to 38.7%, with a higher value indicating a stronger labor union presence in the state. We hypothesize that 
the coefficient for this variable will be negative, indicating that higher state labor union density depresses 
income inequality at the state level. 
 Federal government partisan control. According to Kelly and Witko (2012), partisan control of both 
federal- and state-level governments can have distributive consequences and can hence affect state-level 
income inequality. Bartels (2008) has also shown evidence that the partisanship of the president affects 
income inequality at the national level. We build on this argument and suggest that Republican-controlled 
federal government has a positive effect on state-level income inequality, independent of the effect of 
state government ideology. We code this variable as the number of the three political institutions—the 
presidency, the U.S. House, and the U.S. Senate—controlled by the Democratic Party. This variable is 
coded 0 for Republican control of the federal government, and 3 for Democratic control.  
Social and Demographic Control Variables 
 Real GDP per capita growth. The role of economic development and economic growth in shaping 
levels of income inequality has long been the subject of scholarly inquiry (Kuznets, 1953, 1955), and there 
is some debate about the relationship between economic growth and income inequality (Bartels, 2009). In 
recent years many observers have expressed concerns that the current trends in income inequality in the 
United States are due to a pattern of high economic growth that is spread unevenly throughout the 
income distribution (Bartels 2008). If economic growth is distributed in such a way that most of the gains 
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are received by those in the higher income strata, then economic growth would be positively related to 
state income inequality. We use real per capita income growth rate as a measure of economic growth, and 
we posit that this variable will have a positive effect on income inequality. 
 Manufacturing. Scholars have pointed out that the manufacturing sector represents the largest share 
of the labor market and is characterized by high productivity and relatively high unionization. In developed 
countries, labor shifting from smaller sectors with lower productivity (e.g., agriculture) to manufacturing 
has the effect of decreasing income inequality (Benard and Jensen, 1998; Grant and Wallace, 1994; 
Rodwin and Sazanami, 1991). Using county-level data in the United States, Nielsen and Alderson (1997) 
find that manufacturing employment has a negative effect on income inequality. To capture sector effects, 
we include as a control variable the proportion of manufacturing as a share of gross state product. We 
expect that the size of the manufacturing sector has a negative effect on income inequality.  
 College graduates. Crenshaw and Ameen (1994), Jacobs (1998), and Nielsen and Alderson (1997) find 
that education levels of the population influence income inequality, with both high and low levels of 
education leading to higher inequality. Due to technological advancement over the past 40 years, highly-
educated people have witnessed a significant increase in their earnings, but people with only a high school 
education or those who fail to complete high school have seen a steady decline in their incomes (Bartels, 
2008; Dooley and Gottschalk, 1985; Gottschalk, 1997). Goldin and Katz (2008) suggest that rising income 
inequality is a result of an American educational system that has not kept up with the technological 
revolution over the past three decades. They argue that income inequality has increased because the 
demand for high-skill workers has risen faster than its supply but lower-skill workers have failed to keep up 
with the technological requirements of the present-day economy. Given the importance of education in 
shaping levels of income inequality, we include in our models the percentage of college graduates as a 
share of state population. We expect this variable to have a positive effect on income inequality.  
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 Nonwhite Population. The existing literature suggests that the size of ethnic minority population 
matters for income inequality, but there are competing expectations about the direction of this effect. On 
one hand, Latinos and African Americans are the largest minority groups, representing almost 80% of the 
non-white population. The income gaps between white and minority households—particularly for black 
and Latino households—has been well documented (Nielsen and Alderson, 1997; DeNavas-Walt and 
Proctor 2014). Since members of minority groups have lower mean income than whites, an increase in the 
minority population should be associated with greater dispersion in overall state incomes. Indeed, Kelly 
and Witko (2012) find that income inequality is higher in states with larger nonwhite populations. On the 
other hand, the U.S. immigrant population is ethnically diverse, with migration from Latin America and 
Asia largely driving the recent wave of immigration. Preuhs (2007) and Fording (1997) find that the 
presence of minority population in general can affect policies affecting minority groups, particularly if the 
minority population is accompanied by high mobilization and/or incorporation through descriptive 
representation in policy-making bodies. Given this, we include the percentage of the nonwhite population 
as a control variable to capture the effect of ethnic minority population on income inequality. If the thesis 
of racial disparity in income holds, we would expect a positive association between nonwhite population 
and income inequality. If the mobilization/incorporation thesis is true, we would expect to observe a 
negative association between nonwhite population and income inequality.2 
 Unemployment. Thurow (1987) predicts a positive relationship between the unemployment rate and 
income inequality, since a high unemployment rate creates more people at the lower ends of the income 
                                                     
2 We also estimate our models using different configurations of racial and ethnic population groupings. When we 
estimate our models by replacing the nonwhite population percentage with the black population percentage, our 
findings remain the same. On the other hand, when we include both the black population percentage and the 
Latino population percentage in our model, multicollinearity becomes an issue since a large proportion of the 
immigrant population is also Latino. Given this, we follow the practice of Kelly and Witko (2012) and include the 
nonwhite population percentage as the best measure to capture the effects of minority population in income 
inequality in the American states.   
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distribution. We include the state unemployment rate as a control variable and expect that the coefficient 
for this variable will be positive, indicating that unemployment has a positive effect on inequality. 
 Female labor force participation. Conventional wisdom suggests that more women joining the 
workforce could lead to widening family income gaps, since high-income, high-education women tend to 
marry high-income men. However, Nielsen and Alderson (1997) and Treas (1987) show that female labor 
force participation—especially the participation of low-income women—has an equalizing effect on family 
incomes. Considering these arguments, we control for female labor force participation in our analyses and 
hypothesize that this variable will be negatively related to income inequality.  
Methods 
 In order to estimate the effect of immigration on income inequality in the United States—all-the-while 
controlling for the effects of the prevailing federal /state political environment—we use multiple 
estimation procedures. First, we use static Ordinary Least Square (OLS) models as a baseline specification 
to estimate the effects of immigration (i.e., foreign-born population, LPRs, low-skill and high-skill 
immigrants) on income inequality. Second, we estimate dynamic models of income inequality using the 
Error-Correction Model (ECM), in which we estimate the first-order change in income inequality as a 
function of the lagged-level of income inequality, a lagged term and a first-order difference term of each of 
the four immigration variables, as well as a battery of control variables (De Boef, 2001; De Boef and Keele, 
2008). We suggest that the ECM is a proper dynamic model specification because it helps minimize the 
potential of spurious regressions with the presence of non-stationary time-series data (De Boef and 
Granato, 1997). Panel unit root tests of our inequality measures find consistent evidence that they are 
non-stationary, meaning that the structure of inequality has a long-term memory. Prior studies also 
suggest that there are dynamic relationships between state-level income inequality and various 
socioeconomic and political variables (Kelly and Witko 2012). This model specification can capture both 
the short-term and long-term effects of immigration on income inequality. However, we also present 
 16 
results of basic static models due to the short time dimension of our CSTS data and for the sake of 
comparison. In both the OLS model and the ECM, we also consider the possibility that there is a spatial 
pattern regarding how the foreign-born population is spread across the 50 states. Hence, we apply panel-
corrected standard errors (PCSEs) to correct for spatial autocorrelation.  
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
The Effects of Foreign-Born Population and the LPRs 
 We begin by using data from the CPS March Survey to calculate U.S. national level income inequality 
levels from 1996 to 2008 with and without the immigrant population. In Figure 1 we present a comparison 
of these two trends. As one can see, the level of income inequality is always higher when we include 
immigrants in the population. This figure shows that income inequality in the U.S. over the past two 
decades is indeed marginally higher due to immigration. To be sure, the gap in income inequality with and 
without immigrants is modest, but there is at least a small upward shift when immigrants are included in 
the population used to calculate income inequality.  
 What is the effect of immigration on income inequality, controlling for the effects of federal/state 
political context and other independent variables? In order to explore this question, we estimate both 
static OLS (Table 1) and dynamic ECM (Table 2) models to show how immigration affects income 
inequality, as well as the degree to which certain types of immigrants significantly contribute to rising of 
income inequality. 3   
 We focus our attention first on the first two measures of immigration in both the static and dynamic 
models. In Table 1 we present the static multivariate cross-sectional time-series estimates for three 
                                                     
3 At a simple level, we can see that immigration and income inequality are correlated over the time period of our 
study. In Appendix Figure A1, we present the trends in the average Gini coefficient of income inequality and 
average size of foreign-born population from 1996 to 2008. As one can see, the trends in the yearly means for 
immigration and income inequality are strongly and positively correlated with each other (r = 0.723). We also 
estimate correlations in trends for immigration and income inequality separately for each state. Because of the 
small sample sizes for each state the levels of statistical significance are attenuated, but we find that 41 of 50 
correlations are positive, and of these 20 are significant at least at the somewhat relaxed .10 level. Further, 39 of 
the 50 states exhibit a significant upward trend for both the Gini coefficient and foreign-born population variables.  
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models. The first model only includes the foreign-born population as the measure of the immigrant 
population, while the second model only includes the immigration variable for newly admitted LPRs. The 
third model is a full model that includes both of these immigration variables. As one can see, the foreign-
born population variable has a significant and positive effect on the level of income-inequality in both 
Model (1) (b = 0.001, z = 5.89) and Model (3) (b = 0.001, z = 3.24). Simply, as the foreign born population 
increases, the level of post-redistribution income inequality also increases, controlling for the effects of the 
political contextual variables and other independent variables. In addition, the effects of newly-admitted 
LPRs is also positive and highly significant (b = 0.028, z = 4.95) in Model (2), which is estimated without the 
foreign-born population variable.  
 When we include both the foreign-born population and the newly-admitted LPRs variables in the same 
model, the effect of the former on income inequality remains strong, but the effect of the latter disappears 
to statistical nonsignificance. We note that the coefficients for the newly-admitted LPR variable must be 
interpreted with care. Because newly admitted LPRs are encompassed within the foreign-born population 
variable, the coefficient for the newly admitted LPRs represents the difference in the effects of LPRs and 
the effect of the non-LPR foreign-born population. (In Appendix 1 we present a brief discussion of this 
point.) The question is whether or not new LPRs have an additional effect on income inequality above and 
beyond the effect of the general foreign-born population. However, as one can see from Table 1, we find 
that newly-admitted LPRs do not have a significant effect above and beyond that of the general foreign-
born population (b = 0.002, z = 0.19). Our results suggest that it is the general foreign-born population that 
increases income inequality in the American states and that newly-admitted are statistically 
indistinguishable in their effect on state income inequality. 
 In Table 2, we present the coefficients for our dynamic models of state-level income inequality. Once 
again, we find that income inequality increases in states with a larger foreign-born population. Model (1) in 
Table 2 is estimated by only including the foreign-born population variable as our immigration measure.  
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This model shows that the lagged Gini coefficient is negatively associated with the change in state-level 
income inequality (b = -0.717, z = -8.06), meaning that the level of income inequality at time t is negatively 
correlated with the level of income inequality in the previous time period, t-1. In other words, in the long 
term income inequality would revert toward the underlying equilibrium level--an increase (decrease) in 
the level of income inequality in the previous year (t-1) leads to a significant decrease (increase) in income 
inequality in the subsequent year. Turning to the immigration variable in Model (1) of Table 2, we see that 
the lagged foreign-born population variable has a positive and significant effect on change in income 
inequality (b = 0.001, z = 3.48). This coefficient represents a positive long-term effect on income inequality 
associated with a one-unit increase in immigration in the previous year (t-1). This long-term effect will be 
distributed over future time periods according to the rate of error correction (i.e. the coefficient of the 
lagged dependent variable). The error correction model specifies a long-run equilibrium relationship 
between immigration and inequality. An increase in immigration at year t disrupts the underlying 
equilibrium, causing inequality to increase a total of 0.0014 points, spreading over subsequent years at a 
rate of 71.7% per year.  Specifically, the long-term effect of immigration on inequality is captured by the 
coefficients of the lagged Gini coefficient (b = -0.717, z = -8.06) and lagged foreign-born population (b = 
0.001, z = 3.48). Using DeBoef and Keele’s (2008) approach for measuring long-term effects, we 
approximate the total long-term effect as equal to 0.0014.4 The bottom line is that the foreign-born 
population appears to have a strong positive long-term effect on income inequality in the American states. 
These results provide strong support for our hypothesis that immigration is associated with higher levels of 
income inequality.  
 In Model (2) and (3) of Table 2 we further explore the degree to which income inequality in the 
American states is affected—at least in part—by newly admitted legal permanent residents. As is the case 
for Model (2) in Table 1, we find some evidence that income inequality is related positively to the inflow of 
                                                     
4 Following DeBoef and Keele (2008: 193), we can calculate the long-term effect of immigration as follows:  Long 
term effect = (0.001) / -[-0.717]) = 0.0014. 
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newly admitted LPRs (b = 0.018, z = 2.87). Model (3) leads to the same substantive conclusion as Model (1) 
regarding the short-term and long-term effects of foreign-born population on the change in income 
inequality—i.e., that foreign-born population has a significant and positive long-term effect on inequality. 
Yet our findings suggest that newly admitted LPRs do not have an effect on income inequality above and 
beyond the effect of the general foreign-born population (b =0.000, z = 0.09).  We contend that it is the 
foreign-born population in general that contributes to income inequality, with newly admitted LPRs 
contributing no additional independent effect on income inequality in the American states. 
 A quick review of the control variables in Table 2 shows that the coefficients are generally consistent 
with our expectations. First, both the level of union density and the change in union density are negatively 
associated with the change in income inequality; simply, union membership has the effect of depressing 
levels of income inequality, which confirms our theoretical assumption. On the other hand, increased state 
government liberalism does not, as expected, lead to a decrease in income inequality; this indicates that 
left political power in state governments does not depress income inequality, at least during the time 
period under study. Turning to the socioeconomic variables, there is a positive relationship between real 
per capita income and income inequality; this suggests that the level of income inequality is higher in 
richer states than in poorer states. Moreover (and as expected), both higher percentages of college 
graduates and high unemployment rates are positively related with the change in income inequality, while 
female labor participation is negatively associated with the change in income inequality. Finally, the lagged 
level of non-white population is positively associated with the change in income inequality. This finding is 
indicative that in states with large minority populations, there are also salient racial disparities in income.   
The Effects of Low- and High-Skill Immigrants 
 Thus far we have explored the effects of the general foreign-born population on income inequality, as 
well as the degree to which newly-admitted LPRs have an additional effect above and beyond the effect of 
foreign-born population. Our findings point to a general effect of the foreign-born population, with the 
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effect of newly-admitted LPRs of a similar magnitude to that of the foreign-born population. However, it is 
possible that there are other sources of heterogeneity in the effect of immigration on income inequality. 
One possibility is that the effect of immigration effect varies with the skill levels of the foreign-born 
population. On one hand, it is possible that low-skill immigrants have an effect beyond that of the general 
foreign-born population, since low-skill immigrants are most likely to be in the low-wage labor market, 
experience unstable employment opportunities, and have reduced access to various programs that are 
part of the social safety net. It is also at least theoretically possible that high-skill immigrants also have an 
effect on income inequality, since their incomes may be higher than the median and may stretch the 
income distribution in an upward direction. To capture these possible effects, we replace our general 
foreign-born population variable with variables representing the share of low-skill immigrants (i.e., those 
with educational attainment less than a high-school education) and the share of high-skill immigrants (i.e., 
those with a college degree). 
 Turning to Table 3, in Model (1) we report the results of a model in which state income is depicted as a 
function of the low- and high-skill immigration variables as well as political and social demographic control 
variables. As one can see, without controlling for other immigration variables, the lag term of low-skill 
immigration has a significant and positive effect on income inequality (b = 0.001, z = 3.98). When we only 
include the measure for high-skill immigration in Model (2), we also find that the lagged term of high-skill 
immigration has a significant positive association with income inequality (b = 0.001, z = 1.70) . Turning to 
Model (3) in Table 3, we include both low- and high-skill immigration in the model. We find that only the 
lagged term of low-skill immigration has a significant and positive effect on income inequality (b=0.001, 
z=3.53). Our empirical findings in Table 3 suggest that the positive effect of immigration on income 
inequality is primarily driven by low-skill immigration.  
 The conclusion that we can draw from Tables 1-3 is that immigration has a positive and significant 
long-term effect on state-level income inequality. The general foreign-born population has a strong, 
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consistent effect on inequality, though there is little evidence that newly admitted LPRs have an additional 
effect that goes beyond that of the general foreign-born population. Our evidence also shows that it is 
low-skill immigrants that have a sizable positive effect on income inequality. Overall, at this point we see a 
strong positive effect of the general foreign-born population as well as low-skill immigrants on income 
inequality. In state-year observations with relatively large immigrant populations or low-skill immigrant 
population, income inequality is higher, controlling for the effects of political and social demographic 
control variables.  
Robustness tests using income ratios 
 In order to check the robustness of our findings, we re-estimate our models using alternative 
measures of income inequality based on various income ratios; these results are reported in Appendix 
Tables A1-A2 in our supporting documentation. As a starting point we use the 90/10, 50/10 and 90/50 
income ratios as our dependent variables, and in Table A1 we find that foreign-born population has a 
strong effect on the 90/10 and 90/50 income ratios but not on the 50/10 income ratio. These results 
suggest that the foreign-born population depresses incomes of those at the middle and lower ends of the 
income distribution relative to incomes at the high end of the income distribution. It is perhaps a bit 
puzzling that the positive effect of the foreign-born population on the 50/10 income ratio does not achieve 
statistical significance. In one sense, we would expect the coefficient for the foreign-born population to 
have a strong positive effect on the 50/10 ratio under the argument that those in the lowest-wage labor 
market are most likely to be affected by the influx of immigrants, while individuals with incomes that plant 
them firmly in the middle class would be less affected by the foreign-born population. As is, our findings 
suggest that immigration has little effect on the income gap between the median income group and the 
middle-to-lower classes. 
 Following up on our findings from Table A1, we also consider in Table A2 the degree to which the 
90/10, 90/20, 90/30, and 90/40 ratios are affected by the foreign-born population, and we find strong 
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evidence of immigration effects in all four models. Overall, it appears that immigration has an effect on the 
income ratios comparing upper income groups with those with lower and middle-to-lower incomes, and 
these results are consistent with the general finding that the foreign-born population in the American 
states has an effect on income inequality. 
 In Tables A3-4 we replicate the analysis in Table A1-A2, but for these models we replace the overall 
immigration measure with our measures of low- and high- skill immigration. Consistent with our main 
results reported in Table 3, we find that it is low-skill immigration that significantly affects various income 
ratios and hence increases income inequality. Controlling for the effects of other independent variables, 
we find that low-skill immigration has a positive and significant association with the 90/10 and 90/50 
income ratios, but not the 50/10 income ratio; this suggests that low-skill immigrants lead to higher levels 
of income inequality between those at the upper end of the income distribution, on one hand, and those 
with lower and middle incomes. However, it is worth noting as well that high-skill immigration lowers 
income inequality for the 90/50 income ratio in both the long and short run; this suggests that high-skill 
immigrants raise median incomes relative to those at the highest end, with the result being significantly 
lower levels of income inequality. We follow up this analysis with the model estimates reported in Table 
A4, in which we replicate the results from Table A2 but with the low-skill and high-skill immigration 
variables substituting for the general foreign-born population variable. Consistent with the results from 
Table A2, in Table A4 we show that low-skill immigration has a significant and positive impact on 90/10, 
90/20, 90/30, and 90/40 income ratios, suggesting that income inequality between high- and lower-
income groups expands as a function of increases in the low-skill immigration population. Our results from 
Table A4 also reveal that high-skill immigrants have significant negative effects on income inequality as 
measured by the 90/20, 90/30, and 90/40 ratios. This provides strong evidence of the different effects of 
low-and high-skill immigrants on inequality across various parts of the income distribution. Presumably, 
high-skill immigrants lift up incomes for those in all but the very poorest income decile relative to those in 
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the highest income decile. Taken as a whole, these results confirm that the low-skill immigration depresses 
incomes of those at the middle and lower ends of the income distribution relative to incomes of those at 
the high end of the income distribution. However, we also find that high-skill immigrants may have an 
effect on lowering income inequality for some segments of the income distribution. These findings verify 
our argument that the immigrant population in the U.S. is bifurcated in its skill sets, which is an important 
driving force for income inequality.   
CONCLUSION 
 In this paper we contribute to the existing literature on income inequality in the American states by 
exploring the explanatory value of immigration while at the same time considering federal and state 
political and socioeconomic contexts. Simply, we suggest that there is a positive long-term effect of 
immigration on income inequality in the American states. Immigrants are bifurcated in their skill sets, 
marketability, and income levels. They might possibly take away job opportunities from native-born 
workers and depress their wages, yet immigrants also face barriers in seeking legal employment and their 
ability to participate in welfare programs. All of these conditions contribute to a positive general effect of 
immigration on income inequality. Moreover, we consider the degree to which three subsets of 
immigrants—newly admitted legal permanent residents, low-skill immigrants and high-skill immigrants—
have effects on income inequality. 
 In order to estimate the effects of immigration on income inequality, we begin by using national 
income data to calculate Gini coefficients separately for income distributions that include and exclude the 
foreign-born population. We find that inequality levels have been consistently (but only modestly) higher 
for the income distribution with immigrants than inequality levels for the income distribution without 
immigrants. Further, in order to estimate the degree to which immigrants promote income inequality, we 
employ both static and dynamic models of income inequality in the American states from 1996-2008. We 
find strong and consistent evidence that the foreign-born population has significant and positive long-term 
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effects on state-level income inequality. The finding of such strong effects is reinforced in robustness tests 
that are based on income ratios between those at the high end of the income distribution and those at the 
medium and low levels (i.e., the 90/10, 90/20, 90/30, 90/40 and 90/50 income ratios). Simply, the foreign-
born population is positively and significantly related to higher income ratios for these income pairings. 
 In addition, we find that newly admitted LPRs do not have any significant effect on state-level income 
inequality above and beyond the effect of the general foreign-born population. Yet, our additional models 
with data measuring low- and high-skill immigration show some important differences in how these 
immigrant groups affect income inequality. We find a significant and positive effect of low-skill 
immigration on income inequality, both in general (as measured by the Gini coefficient) and for specific 
income ratios comparing high-income individuals with those at the median income and below. Simply, 
low-skill immigrants have the effect of increasing income inequality in the American states. On the other 
hand, while high-skill immigrants do not have an effect on income inequality as measured by a general 
indicator such as the Gini coefficient, high-skill immigrants do depress income inequality for certain 
segments of the income distribution—most notably, in comparisons between those in the top income 
decile and those at the median income or below.  
 Several independent variables are found to have significant effects on income inequality. We find that 
union density has a negative effect on state income inequality, though state government liberalism and 
Democratic control of national government have little effect on the dependent variable. Five of the social 
demographic control variables significantly influence state income inequality. While female labor force 
participation has a negative effect on inequality, the unemployment rate, percent of college graduates, 
nonwhite population, and (to a lesser extent) real per capita income all promote higher levels of income 
inequality. States with lower female labor force participation rates, high unemployment, a large minority 
population, an educated citizenry with a large share of college graduates, and high rates of economic 
growth are particularly likely to have a higher level of income inequality.   
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 Taken as a whole, our empirical results provide macro-level support for previous findings documented 
by economists that immigration increases wage inequalities at the micro-level (Borjas, 1994, 2000, 2004; 
Chevan and Stokes, 2000; Reed, 2001). Most importantly, the effect of immigration on inequality is 
consistent and robust when we control a full set of political and social demographic control variables or 
when we use alternative inequality measures.  
 What are the political and policy implications of our findings?  First, we contend that immigration has 
had—and will continue to have—an important effect on domestic economic outcomes. In particular, our 
findings suggest that immigration contributes to the increasing economic disparity among members of 
society. This is a non- trivial effect of immigration and is a result of relative disadvantages that immigrants 
have in marketable skills, but also due to laws, politics, and policies. State policies that create and maintain 
a strong social safety net for the foreign-born population may generate a weaker effect of immigration on 
inequality, since immigrants in the low-wage labor market may be more likely to benefit from such 
redistributive policies. The adoption of a wider-range of social safety net policies benefitting immigrants 
may help to close the income gap between immigrants and their native-born counterparts and hence 
result in a reduced effect of immigration on state income inequality. 
 Alternatively, it is clear from our findings that the mix of immigrants who come to the United States 
influence the levels of income inequality in the American states. Our findings that low-skill immigrants 
raise income inequality while high-skill immigrants lower income inequality for certain selective income 
pairings point to the importance of considering the values that undergird American immigration policy. 
One possible way to mitigate the effects of immigration on income inequality is to see changes in 
immigration policy that result in a change in the mix of immigrants admitted to the United States. An 
immigration policy that shifts the focus toward admitting more high-skill immigrants and fewer low-skill 
immigrants may reduce the effect of immigration on income inequality.   
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Figure 1: Gini coefficients with and without immigrants in the United States 
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Table 1. Panel corrected standard error (PCSE) estimates of effect of immigration on state income inequality, static estimates, 1996-2008 
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
                  (1)          (2)          (3) 
             --------------------------------   --------------------------------   -------------------------------- 
Variable               b       z       b       z      b       z 
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Foreign-born population         0.001    5.89***      ---       ---     0.001    3.24*** 
Newly-admitted legal permanent residents       ---       ---     0.026    4.95***    0.002    0.19 
 
Union density          -0.001   -6.68***   -0.001   -7.31***   -0.001   -7.49*** 
State government liberalism        0.000   -0.68    0.000   -1.08    0.000   -0.74 
Real per capita income growth        0.000    0.79    0.000    0.73    0.000    1.11 
Manufacturing          -0.002   -0.15    0.000    0.01    0.003    0.26 
College graduates           0.071    3.21***    0.083    3.92***    0.074    3.26*** 
Nonwhite population          0.021    3.85***    0.028    5.11***    0.021    3.74*** 
Unemployment rate          0.002    3.08***    0.002    3.42***    0.002    3.17*** 
Female labor force participation      -0.001   -4.24***   -0.001   -5.84***   -0.001   -5.26*** 
Federal government partisan control     -0.003   -1.60   -0.003   -1.97*   -0.003   -1.90* 
 
Constant            0.444         31.76***    0.450         33.62***    0.444         32.54*** 
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
N               650        637        637 
R2               0.341       0.356       0.364 
Wald χ2              675.48       715.61       664.78 
Prob (Wald χ2)            0.000       0.000       0.000 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
*** prob < 0.001  ** prob < 0.01  * prob < 0.05 
  
 28 
Table 2. Panel corrected standard error (PCSE) estimates of effect of immigration on change in state income inequality, dynamic estimates, 1996-
2008 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
               (1)        (2)        (3) 
             --------------------------------   ----------------------------------   -------------------------------- 
Variable                b        z        b        z        b        z 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Lagged Gini coefficient-         0.717   -8.06***   -0.699   -8.03***   -0.710   -8.09*** 
         
Lagged foreign-born population       0.001    3.48***      ---       ---     0.001    1.94* 
First difference, foreign-born population      0.000    0.37      ---       ---     0.000    0.09 
         
Newly-admitted legal permanent residents       ---       ---     0.018    2.87**    0.001    0.09 
         
Lagged union density         -0.001   -4.00***   -0.001   -3.62***   -0.001   -3.71*** 
First difference, union density       -0.001   -1.76*   -0.001   -1.58   -0.001   -1.65* 
         
Lagged state government liberalism       0.000    0.11    0.000    0.02    0.000    0.30 
First difference, state government liberalism     0.000   -1.46    0.000   -1.49    0.000   -1.40 
         
Lagged real per capita income        0.000   -0.41    0.000   -0.67    0.000   -0.33 
First difference, real per capita income      0.002    1.75*    0.002    1.54    0.002    1.65* 
         
Lagged manufacturing         -0.003   -0.22   -0.002   -0.12   -0.001   -0.04 
First difference, manufacturing        0.059    0.86    0.055    0.80    0.048    0.69 
 
Lagged college graduates         0.045    1.87*    0.054    2.47**    0.047    2.18* 
First difference, college graduates       0.117    2.16*    0.117    2.10*    0.112    2.02* 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
  
  
 29 
Table 2 (continued) 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
               (1)        (2)        (3) 
             --------------------------------   ----------------------------------   -------------------------------- 
Variable                b        z        b        z        b        z 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Lagged nonwhite population        0.013    2.14*    0.018    2.57**    0.014    2.07* 
First difference, nonwhite population      0.205    1.60    0.281    2.32*    0.225    1.65* 
         
Lagged unemployment rate        0.003    3.42***    0.002    3.12***    0.003    3.16*** 
First difference, unemployment rate      0.002    1.24    0.001    0.97    0.002    1.11 
         
Lagged female labor force participation     -0.001   -1.94*   -0.001   -2.23*   -0.001   -2.05* 
First difference, female labor force participation   -0.001   -0.96   -0.001   -1.19   -0.001   -1.15 
         
Lagged federal government partisan control    -0.002   -0.81   -0.002   -0.93   -0.002   -0.85 
First difference, federal government partisan control  -0.002   -1.25   -0.003   -1.48   -0.003   -1.26 
         
Constant            0.306    7.25***    0.305    7.24***    0.304    7.30*** 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
N               600        587        587 
R2               0.396       0.378       0.382 
Wald χ2              100.44       98.13       100.01 
Prob (Wald χ2)            0.000       0.000       0.000 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
*** prob < 0.001  ** prob < 0.01  * prob < 0.05 
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Table 3. Panel corrected standard error (PCSE) estimates of effect of high- and low-skill immigrants on state income inequality, dynamic 
estimates, 1996-2008 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
               (1)        (2)        (3) 
             --------------------------------   ----------------------------------   -------------------------------- 
Variable                b        z        b        z        b        z 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Lagged Gini coefficient        -0.725   -8.12***  -0.696   -7.86   -0.726   -8.12*** 
         
Lagged low-skill foreign-born population     0.001    3.98***      ---       ---     0.001    3.53*** 
First difference, low-skill foreign-born population   0.001    0.46      ---       ---     0.001    0.65 
         
Lagged high-skill foreign-born population       ---       ---     0.001    1.70*   -0.001   -0.50 
First difference, high-skill foreign-born population     ---       ---     0.002    1.03    0.001    0.43 
         
Lagged union density         -0.001   -3.72***  -0.001   -3.38***   0.000   -2.94** 
First difference, union density       -0.001   -1.69*   -0.001   -1.61   -0.001   -1.65* 
         
Lagged state government liberalism      0.000    0.18    0.000   -0.37    0.000    0.16 
First difference, state government liberalism    0.000   -1.55    0.000   -1.51    0.000   -1.58 
         
Lagged real per capita income        0.000   -0.05    0.000   -0.63    0.000    0.08 
First difference, real per capita income      0.002    1.80*    0.002    1.55    0.002    1.79* 
         
Lagged manufacturing        -0.007   -0.45   -0.011   -0.74   -0.007   -0.45 
First difference, manufacturing       0.060    0.87    0.060    0.87    0.064    0.95 
         
Lagged college graduates         0.057    2.58**    0.048    1.75*    0.064    2.25* 
First difference, college graduates       0.123    2.32**    0.114    1.97*    0.121    2.16* 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
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Table 3 (continued) 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
               (1)        (2)        (3) 
             --------------------------------   ----------------------------------   -------------------------------- 
Variable               b       z       b          z      b       z 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Lagged nonwhite population        0.015    2.67**    0.020    2.91**    0.016    2.65** 
First difference, nonwhite population      0.190    1.50    0.252    2.01*    0.182    1.43 
         
Lagged unemployment rate        0.002    3.06***    0.003    3.22***    0.002    2.75** 
First difference, unemployment rate      0.002    1.18    0.002    1.22    0.002    1.14 
         
Lagged female labor force participation     -0.001   -2.43**   -0.001   -1.91*   -0.001   -2.27* 
First difference, female labor force participation   -0.001   -1.09   -0.001   -0.85   -0.001   -1.12 
         
Lagged federal government partisan control    -0.002   -0.86   -0.002   -0.81   -0.002   -0.86 
First difference, federal government partisan control  -0.003   -1.28   -0.003   -1.28   -0.003   -1.30 
         
Constant            0.313    7.33***    0.302    7.10***    0.314    7.31*** 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
N               600        600        600 
R2               0.398       0.387       0.399 
Wald χ2              101.30       98.65       104.05 
Prob (Wald χ2)            0.000       0.000       0.000 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
*** prob < 0.001  ** prob < 0.01  * prob < 0.05 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 1: Interpreting the Effects of Newly-Admitted Legal Permanent Residents 
 We note that the coefficients for the newly-admitted LPR variable must be interpreted with care. 
Because newly admitted LPRs are encompassed within the foreign-born population variable, the 
coefficient for the newly admitted LPRs represents the difference in the effects of LPRs and the effect of 
the non-LPR foreign-born population. Specifically, our full model of the effects of immigration on income 
inequality looks like this: 
 Income inequality = a + b1(Foreign-born population) + b2(LPRs) + controls      (1) 
However, the foreign-born population variable actually includes LPRs, as well as the remaining individuals 
who are part of the foreign-born population. We can break out these two groups thusly: 
 Income inequality = a + b1(Other foreign-born population + LPRs) + b2 (LPRs) +controls   (2) 
Rearranging the terms: 
 Income inequality = a + b1 (Other foreign-born population) + b1 (LPRs) + b2 (LPRs) + controls (3) 
We can now collect terms to generate the following equation, which reveals the appropriate 
interpretation of the coefficients for these three variables: 
 Income inequality  =  a + b1 (Other foreign-born population) + (b1 + b2) (LPRs)  + controls  (4) 
Given this, b1 represents the effect on income inequality of other foreign-born population (i.e., non-new 
LPRs), and b2 represents the difference in the effect for the foreign-born population and new LPRs. The 
question is whether or not new LPRs have an additional effect on income inequality above and beyond the 
effect of the general foreign-born population.  
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Appendix Figure A1: Time trends for average Gini coefficients of income inequality and the size of 
foreign-born population, 1996-2008. 
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Table A1. Panel corrected standard error (PCSE) estimates of effect of immigration on change in various income ratios, dynamic estimates, 
1996-2008 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
                90/10 Ratio        90/50 Ratio        50/10 Ratio 
             --------------------------------   ----------------------------------   -------------------------------- 
Variable               b       z       b        z       b       z 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Lagged income ratio         -0.619   -9.12***  -0.718   -9.71***  -0.670   -9.19** 
         
Lagged foreign-born population       0.017    2.11*    0.006    2.91**    0.000    0.11 
First difference, foreign-born population    -0.036   -1.14   -0.009   -1.51   -0.003   -0.30 
         
Newly-admitted legal permanent residents    -0.432   -1.39   -0.084   -1.31   -0.088   -1.05 
         
Lagged union density         -0.012   -2.55**   -0.005   -4.30***   0.000    0.22 
First difference, union density       -0.007   -0.26    0.001    0.12   -0.003   -0.34 
         
Lagged state government liberalism      0.001    0.72    0.000   -0.55    0.000    1.48 
First difference, state government liberalism    0.004    1.63    0.000    0.44    0.001    1.80 
         
Lagged real per capita income        0.001    0.12    0.002    0.95   -0.001   -0.28 
First difference, real per capita income      0.095    2.70**    0.007    1.16    0.030    2.62** 
          
Lagged manufacturing         0.092    0.19    0.045    0.42   -0.072   -0.46 
First difference, manufacturing       3.952   -1.70*   -0.591   -1.16   -1.057   -1.37 
         
Lagged college graduates         2.414    3.10***    0.394    2.34**    0.567    2.32** 
First difference, college graduates       2.434    1.29    0.605    1.71*    0.178    0.28 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
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Table A1 (continued) 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
                90/10 Ratio        90/50 Ratio        50/10 Ratio 
             --------------------------------   ----------------------------------   -------------------------------- 
Variable               b       z       b      z      b      z 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Lagged nonwhite population        0.845    3.17***    0.151    2.82**    0.200    2.73** 
First difference, nonwhite population      7.263    2.24*    1.746    2.46**    0.729    0.75 
         
Lagged unemployment rate        0.122    4.16***    0.008    1.60    0.046    4.72*** 
First difference, unemployment rate      0.006    0.15   -0.002   -0.21    0.002    0.20 
         
Lagged female labor force participation     -0.021   -2.74**   -0.010   -6.42***   0.003    1.11 
First difference, female labor force participation   -0.028   -1.16   -0.013   -2.62**    0.008    0.85 
         
Lagged federal government partisan control    -0.031   -0.65   -0.019   -1.70*    0.017    1.09 
First difference, federal government partisan control   0.063    1.90    0.004    0.51    0.025    2.33* 
         
Constant            4.374    5.38***    2.044    8.46***    1.550    5.21*** 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
N               637        637        637 
R2               0.383       0.405       0.384 
Wald χ2              155.38       135.05       123.50 
Prob (Wald χ2)            0.000       0.000       0.000 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
*** prob < 0.001  ** prob < 0.01  * prob < 0.05 
  
 39 
Table A2. Panel corrected standard error (PCSE) estimates of effect of immigration on change in various income ratios for the 90th percentile, 
dynamic estimates, 1996-2008 
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
             90/10 Ratio    90/20 Ratio    90/30 Ratio    90/40 Ratio 
            ---------------------------  --------------------------  -------------------------  --------------------------- 
Variable              b      z      b      z      b      z      b      z 
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Lagged income ratio        -0.619  -9.12***  -0.590  -8.37***  -0.654  -8.96***  -0.686  -9.35*** 
            
Lagged foreign-born population      0.017   2.11*   0.011   2.35**   0.010   2.99**   0.008   3.53*** 
First difference, foreign-born population    -0.036  -1.14  -0.028  -1.74  -0.019  -1.86  -0.018  -2.36* 
            
Newly-admitted legal permanent residents   -0.432  -1.39  -0.270  -1.62  -0.175  -1.45  -0.142  -1.75 
            
Lagged union density        -0.012  -2.55**  -0.009  -3.85***  -0.009  -4.98***  -0.007  -4.78*** 
First difference, union density      -0.007  -0.26  -0.009  -0.64  -0.005  -0.55  -0.001  -0.18 
            
Lagged state government liberalism      0.001   0.72   0.000   0.45   0.000   0.01   0.000   0.06 
First difference, state government liberalism    0.004   1.63   0.001   0.79   0.001   1.36   0.001   1.19 
             
Lagged real per capita income       0.001   0.12   0.003   0.61   0.001   0.51   0.001   0.72 
First difference, real per capita income     0.095   2.70**   0.040   2.29*   0.024   2.02*   0.018   2.21* 
            
Lagged manufacturing         0.092   0.19   0.096   0.55   0.008   0.05   0.061   0.48 
First difference, manufacturing      -3.952  -1.70*  -2.214  -1.80*  -1.867  -2.09*  -1.261  -1.99* 
            
Lagged college graduates        2.414   3.10***   1.347   3.19***   0.882   2.85**   0.593   2.84** 
First difference, college graduates      2.434   1.29   1.792   1.99*   1.375   2.11*   0.999   2.05* 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
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Table A2 (continued) 
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
             90/10 Ratio    90/20 Ratio    90/30 Ratio    90/40 Ratio 
            ---------------------------  --------------------------  -------------------------  --------------------------- 
Variable              b      z      b      z      b      z      b      z 
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Lagged nonwhite population       0.845   3.17***   0.481   3.65***   0.307   2.94**   0.227   3.20*** 
First difference, nonwhite population     7.263   2.24*   5.438   2.93**   3.467   2.91**   3.172   3.78*** 
            
Lagged unemployment rate       0.122   4.16***   0.047   3.78***   0.034   3.87***   0.018   2.84** 
First difference, unemployment rate     0.006   0.15   0.011   0.54   0.010   0.79   0.007   0.76 
            
Lagged female labor force participation    -0.021  -2.74**  -0.015  -3.58***  -0.012  -4.61***  -0.011  -5.80*** 
First difference, female labor force participation  -0.028  -1.16  -0.030  -2.40**  -0.021  -2.44**  -0.018  -3.01** 
            
Lagged federal government partisan control   -0.031  -0.65  -0.043  -1.37  -0.041  -2.11*  -0.034  -2.57** 
First difference, federal government partisan control  0.063   1.90   0.040   1.76   0.017   1.20   0.004   0.41 
            
Constant           4.374   5.38***   2.954   6.02***   2.570   6.98***   2.320   7.62*** 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
N              637      637      637      637 
R2              0.383     0.355     0.385     0.403 
Wald χ2             155.38     144.71     145.03     164.65 
Prob (Wald χ2)           0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
*** prob < 0.001  ** prob < 0.01  * prob < 0.05 
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Table A3. Panel corrected standard error (PCSE) estimates of effect of high- and low-skill immigration on change in various income ratios, 
dynamic estimates, 1996-2008 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
                90/10 Ratio        90/50 Ratio        50/10 Ratio 
             --------------------------------   ----------------------------------   -------------------------------- 
Variable               b       z       b          z     b       z 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Lagged income ratio         -0.633   -7.71***  -0.753   -9.42***  -0.655   -8.06*** 
         
Lagged low-skill foreign-born population     0.039    3.63***    0.015    5.32***   -0.001   -0.26 
First difference, low-skill foreign-born population  -0.008   -0.17   -0.005   -0.61    0.003    0.22 
         
Lagged high-skill foreign-born population    -0.047   -1.45   -0.016   -2.65**   -0.002   -0.21 
First difference, high-skill foreign-born population  -0.023   -0.36   -0.026   -2.12*    0.027    1.32 
         
Lagged union density         -0.011   -1.94*   -0.003   -3.26***  -0.001   -0.41 
First difference, union density       -0.004   -0.14    0.003    0.57   -0.005   -0.56 
         
Lagged state government liberalism      0.001    0.79    0.000   -0.35    0.000    1.38 
First difference, state government liberalism    0.002    0.98    0.000    0.02    0.001    1.37 
         
Lagged real per capita income       -0.001   -0.07    0.003    1.59   -0.003   -0.82 
First difference, real per capita income      0.104    2.76**    0.008    1.21    0.031    2.60** 
           
Lagged manufacturing        -0.061   -0.12   -0.007   -0.06   -0.053   -0.38 
First difference, manufacturing      -2.413   -0.89   -0.405   -0.82   -0.673   -0.78 
         
Lagged college graduates         2.878    2.67**    0.635    3.02**    0.511    1.74* 
First difference, college graduates       2.949    1.38    0.709    1.94*    0.231    0.32 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
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Table A3 (continued) 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
                90/10 Ratio        90/50 Ratio        50/10 Ratio 
             --------------------------------   ----------------------------------   -------------------------------- 
Variable               b       z       b          z     b       z 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Lagged nonwhite population        0.937    3.43***    0.191    3.59***    0.189    2.42** 
First difference, nonwhite population      5.482    1.41    1.420    1.76*    0.535    0.61 
         
Lagged unemployment rate        0.115    4.00***    0.005    1.10    0.044    4.53*** 
First difference, unemployment rate      0.011    0.28   -0.003   -0.42    0.007    0.64 
         
Lagged female labor force participation     -0.018   -1.41   -0.011   -4.30***   0.004    1.38 
First difference, female labor force participation   -0.003   -0.10   -0.010   -2.02*    0.014    1.53 
         
Lagged federal government partisan control    -0.003   -0.06   -0.013   -1.10    0.018    1.08 
First difference, federal government partisan control   0.080    1.77    0.006    0.65    0.028    2.35* 
         
Constant            4.324    4.69***    2.097    7.97***    1.517    5.03*** 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
N               650        650        650 
R2               0.353       0.405       0.360 
Wald χ2              98.56       119.76       91.93 
Prob (Wald χ2)            0.000       0.000       0.000 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
*** prob < 0.001  ** prob < 0.01  * prob < 0.05 
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Table A4. Panel corrected standard error (PCSE) estimates of effect of high- and low-skill immigration on change in various income ratios for the 
90th percentile, dynamic estimates, 1996-2008 
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
             90/10 Ratio    90/20 Ratio    90/30 Ratio    90/40 Ratio 
            ---------------------------  --------------------------  -------------------------  --------------------------- 
Variable              b      z      b      z      b      z      b      z 
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Lagged income ratio        -0.633  -7.71***  -0.621  -7.98***  -0.680  -8.81***  -0.722  -9.08*** 
            
Lagged low-skill foreign-born population     0.039   3.63***   0.031   4.21***   0.024   4.71***   0.020   5.57*** 
First difference, low-skill foreign-born population  -0.008  -0.17  -0.006  -0.25  -0.008  -0.45  -0.018  -1.51 
            
Lagged high-skill foreign-born population   -0.047  -1.45  -0.045  -2.52**  -0.026  -2.02*  -0.024  -2.80** 
First difference, high-skill foreign-born population  -0.023  -0.36  -0.060  -1.71  -0.030  -1.30  -0.027  -1.70 
            
Lagged union density        -0.011  -1.94*  -0.007  -2.71**  -0.007  -4.00***  -0.006  -3.80*** 
First difference, union density      -0.004  -0.14  -0.005  -0.40  -0.002  -0.24   0.001   0.19 
            
Lagged state government liberalism      0.001   0.79   0.000   0.74   0.000   0.13   0.000   0.11 
First difference, state government liberalism    0.002   0.98   0.000   0.31   0.001   0.91   0.000   0.66 
            
Lagged real per capita income      -0.001  -0.07   0.005   1.01   0.003   1.13   0.003   1.42 
First difference, real per capita income     0.104   2.76**   0.042   2.43**   0.023   2.08*   0.018   2.25* 
            
Lagged manufacturing        -0.061  -0.12   0.004   0.02  -0.082  -0.47  -0.006  -0.04 
First difference, manufacturing      -2.413  -0.89  -1.664  -1.31  -1.484  -1.67*  -0.947  -1.51 
            
Lagged college graduates        2.878   2.67**   1.957   3.44***   1.301   3.21***   0.967   3.46*** 
First difference, college graduates      2.949   1.38   2.137   2.21*   1.414   2.00*   1.006   2.01* 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
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Table A4 (continued) 
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
             90/10 Ratio    90/20 Ratio    90/30 Ratio    90/40 Ratio 
            ---------------------------  --------------------------  -------------------------  --------------------------- 
Variable              b      z      b      z      b      z      b      z 
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Lagged nonwhite population       0.937   3.43***   0.562   4.23***   0.378   3.65***   0.290   4.17*** 
First difference, nonwhite population     5.482   1.41   4.451   1.94*   2.884   2.27*   2.734   3.10*** 
            
Lagged unemployment rate       0.115   4.00***   0.043   3.31***   0.031   3.64***   0.015   2.48** 
First difference, unemployment rate     0.011   0.28   0.010   0.50   0.009   0.68   0.006   0.66 
            
Lagged female labor force participation    -0.018  -1.41  -0.017  -2.87**  -0.014  -3.68***  -0.013  -4.04*** 
First difference, female labor force participation  -0.003  -0.10  -0.022  -1.76*  -0.016  -1.91*  -0.014  -2.21* 
            
Lagged federal government partisan control   -0.003  -0.06  -0.027  -0.78  -0.030  -1.53  -0.026  -1.92* 
First difference, federal government partisan control  0.080   1.77   0.048   1.78   0.022   1.53   0.008   0.75 
             
Constant           4.324   4.69***   3.031   5.79***   2.614   6.83***   2.393   7.25*** 
 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
N              650      650      650      650  
R2              0.353     0.349     0.375     0.397 
Wald χ2             98.56     115.85     122.85     145.77 
Prob (Wald χ2)           0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
*** prob < 0.001  ** prob < 0.01  * prob < 0.05 
